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Second Circuit Survey 
By Jay Curlisle* 
During the 2005 survey year, federal courts in the Second Circuit 
decided a number of important res judicata matters.' Several district 
courts applied the doctrines of claim preclusion2 and issue preclusion3 to 
administrative and arbitral  determination^.^ Several courts also 
expanded the "actually litigated" requirement for collateral estoppel5 and 
liberally applied the doctine of defensive claim preclusion for 
 counterclaim^.^ Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
*professor of Law, Pace University; Elected Life Fellow of the American Bar Foundation. 
1. See infra notes 2, 6, 8, 11, 14, 21, 27, 30, 34, 37, 39, 41, 44, 47, 48, 50, 52, 58 and 
accompanying text. 
2. Claim preclusion is sometimes referred to as res judicata. Claim preclusion has 
been defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as follows: after a 
final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, res judicata 
"precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been 
raised in that action." Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 400 F.3d 139, 141 (2d 
Cir. 2005); see also St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 2000); see generally 18 
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 131.10(l)(a) (3d ed. 
2005). 
3. Issue preclusion is sometimes referred to as collateral estoppel. The Second Circuit 
defined issue preclusion in Rezzonico v. H & R Block, Inc., 182 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1999). 
If subsequent litigation arises from a different cause of action, the prior judgment bars only 
those matters or issues common to both actions that were expressly or by necessary 
implication adjudicated in the prior litigation. This prong of res judicata is referred to as issue 
preclusion. The United States Supreme Court stated that issue preclusion means when an 
issue has been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated 
between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Id. (quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 
232 (1994)). 
4. See infra notes 44,47,48,50, 52,58,60 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 2 1,27 and accompanying text. 
6. See Neshewat v. Salem, 305 F. Supp. 2d 508, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In 
Neshewat, Judge William C. Comer held that the defendant's counterclaim was barred by 
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Second Circuit issued seven res judicata decisions.' In one, Vargas v. 
City of New yorkY8 the Second Circuit refined the standards for applying 
the Rooker-Feldman d~c t r ine .~  This survey article will review some of 
the Second Circuit's significant res judicata decisions and will critique 
those giving preclusive effect to administrative and arbitral 
determinations. 
The term res judicata has been used by the Second Circuit in 
reference to a variety of concepts focusing on the preclusive effects of a 
judgment on subsequent litigation. Claim preclusion occurs pursuant to 
"merger" and "bar" principles'0 and operates to preclude all other claims 
claim preclusion. Defendant previously brought an action against the plaintiff wherein he 
asked the court to overturn a state court default judgment entered against him. That was 
exactly the relief defendant sought to assert in his counterclaim based on the same set of facts. 
Judge Conner stated: 
Changing the legal theory upon which the request for relief is based does not bar 
the applicability of res judicata. Furthermore, the previous action involved an 
adjudication on the merits, involved both parties involved in the present action, and 
the claims asserted in this action were or could have been asserted in the prior 
action. 
Id. 
7. See infra notes 21; 27, 30, 34,37,39,41 and accompanying text. 
8. 377 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2004). 
9. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from two Supreme Court cases, 
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldrnan, 
460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that lower federal courts "lack 
subject matter jurisdiction 'over cases that effectively seek review ofjudgments of state courts 
and that federal review, if any, can occur only by way of certiorari petition to the Supreme 
Court."' Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Moccio v. N.Y. 
State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1996)). In Rooker, the Supreme 
Court held that "no federal court, other than the Supreme Court, can consider a claim to 
reverse or modify a state court judgment." Phifer, 289 F.3d ai 55 (citing Rooker, 263 U.S. at 
416). In Feldman, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the principal and held that if 
plaintiffs claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court's determination, the district 
court does not have jurisdiction to entertain those claims. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16. 
10. See OSCAR G.  CHASE & ROBERT A. BARKER, CIVIL LITIGATION IN NEW 
YORK 4 23.01, at 927 (4th ed. 2002) ("Claim preclusion, which includes the doctrines of 
'merger' and 'bar' is operative 'when a judgment is rendered in an action and a second action 
is sought to be maintained on the same claim. Ordinarily, if the judgment was rendered for 
the plaintiff, the claim is held to be extinguished and merged in the judgment; if the judgment 
was rendered for the defendant . . . the judgment is a bar to a second action on the same 
claim. "'). 
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arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions, even if based 
upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy." Issue 
preclusion precludes a .  party or his privy from relitigating in a 
subsequent action an issue that was actually litigated and necessary to 
judgment in the prior action.12 It occurs when one party to a civil action 
argues that preclusive effect should be given to one or more issues 
determined in an earlier civil action, administrative proceeding, or 
arbitration between the same parties in the same jurisdiction. The 
United States Supreme Court explained the difference between claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion in Parklane Hosiery Company v. Shore: 
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars 
a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same 
cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, 
the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the 
prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the 
outcome of the first action. 13 
Application of claim and issue preclusion requires a valid, final 
judgment on the merits. A valid judgment is one issued by a court with 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. A final judgment usually does 
not contemplate the full completion of the appellate process.'4 
Moreover, the term "on the merits" includes dismissals on statute of 
limitations grounds'5 and default judgments.I6 Because there are few 
statutory justifications for applications of claim and issue preclusion, 
public policy justifications are determinative and underlie each of the 
Circuit's res judicata 2005 decisions. Such public policy justifications 
for claim and issue preclusion include society's desires to promote 
fairness," prevent inconsistent judgments, achieve uniformity and 
1 1. Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 400 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 2005). 
12. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,327 n.5 (1979). 
13. Id. 
14. But see Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Bickel, 123 F. App'x 416, 417 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that, in some jurisdictions (Illinois), a judgment is not final for claim preclusive 
effect until the time for appeal has expired or until appeals have been exhausted). 
15. See CHASE & BARKER, supra note 10, at 940-41 (citing Smith v. Russell Sage 
College, 429 N.E.2d 746 (N.Y. 1981)). 
16. Reich v. Cochran, 45 N.E. 367 (N.Y. 1896). See generally DAVID D. SIEGEL, 
NEW YORK PRACTICE 726 (3d student ed. 1999). 
17. Concepts of fair play and due process have consistently been important policy 
considerations for district courts in the Second Circuit and for the circuit court when 
considering whether to apply claim and issue preclusion. S.E.C. v. Monarch Funding Corp., 
192 F.3d 295,303-04 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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certainty,'* finalize disputes among the parties,'g and conserve judicial 
r e s o ~ r c e s . ~ ~  
In Vargas v. City of New ~ork," a former New York City police 
officer was tried on departmental charges of using excessive force in 
effectuating an arrest. After charges were sustained, Vargas was 
dismissed from the NYPD and sought review in a state court pursuant to 
Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and ~ u l e s . ' ~  The state 
court concluded the charges were supported by substantial e~idence. '~ 
Vargas then sued in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983, alleging his dismissal 
violated equal protection and due process. The district court dismissed 
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine. This doctrine provides that inferior federal courts have no 
subject matter jurisdiction over some cases that seek review of state 
court judgments. The Second Circuit applies the doctrine to claims and 
issues that would be barred under principles of preclusion.24 
In Vargas, the circuit court stated: "Under the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine, inferior courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over suits 
that seek direct review of judgments of state courts, or that seek to 
resolve issues that are 'inextricably intertwined' with earlier state court 
 determination^."^^ The circuit court pointed out that the U.S. Supreme 
Court provides few standards or guidance for determining when claims 
are inextricably intertwined with prior state court judgments, but noted, 
at a minimum, that it was necessary that a federal plaintiff had an 
opportunity to litigate the claim in the state proceeding. Because Vargas 
could not have brought his 9 1983 claim in a state Article 78 proceeding, 
the circuit court stated that "only issue preclusion triggers the Rooker- 
18. See Id. See also Brainerd Cunie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the 
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281,289 (1957). 
19. See Monarch, 192 F.3d at 303-04. 
20. See Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420,424-25 (2d Cir. 1999). 
2 1. 377 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2004). 
22. See Vargas v. Safir, 7 17 N.Y.S.2d 562 (App. Div. 2000). 
23. Id. at 563. 
24. Vargas, 377 F.3d at 203. 
25. Id. at 205. 
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Feldman bar."26 The court then explained that, under New York law, 
issue preclusion will be applied if there is identity of issue (the issue in 
question was actually litigated and necessary to the judgment in the prior 
action) and if the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action. The Second 
Circuit held that the issue in Vargas's federal action, alleging individual 
and department-wide racial discrimination, was not actually and 
necessarily decided in the state proceeding. Thus, the court reversed the 
district court's dismissal of plaintiffs claims and stated: 
While it is true that the Article 78 court passed upon the propriety of Vargas's 
termination, this acknowledgement does not demonstrate that the court 
'actually and necessarily' decided an issue that was never presented to it, even 
if that issue touched, in a general sense, on the propriety o f  the termination. 27 
In another Second Circuit case, Grant v. City of New ~ a v e n , * ~  the 
plaintiff brought a pro se action against the City of New Haven. Grant 
had previously sued the city in Connecticut Superior Court. The state 
court held against Grant. The United States District Court for the 
District of Connecticut dismissed the action on grounds of res judicata 
and pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court's decision and stated: "Grant cannot seek 
reversal of the state court judgment simply by recasting his complaint in 
the form of a civil rights complaint."29 The circuit court's dismissal was 
final and the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to amend his 
complaint because the circuit believed it was "unlikely" that an amended 
complaint would succeed.30 The Second Circuit's decision is 
questionable because, generally, pro se plaintiffs are given at least one 
opportunity to amend a complaint subject to di~missal.~'  
Conversely, in Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S. P.A.?~ 
the Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a retaliatory 
discharge claim on the grounds that it was not barred by the doctrine of 
claim preclusion. In 1995, Legnani filed a Title VII action against the 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 206. 
28. 1 15 F. App'x 475 (2d Cir. 2004). 
29. Id. at 476. 
30. Id. 
31. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 5.7, at 267-68, 5 
5.15, at 293-94 (4th ed. 2005). See also Dioguardi v. Duming, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). 
32. 400 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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defendant and in 1998, while the 1995 action was pending, the defendant 
fired Legnani. The plaintiff sought leave to amend her 1995 complaint 
to add a retaliatory discharge claim based on this event, but the district 
court denied the request. Legnani did not appeal the ruling, and the 
court awarded judgment for the defendant on the 1995 claim. 
Legnani then brought the retaliatory discharge claim in a complaint 
filed in 1999. The district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, 
but the Second Circuit reversed.33 On remand, the defendant moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that Legnani's discharge claim was barred 
by the doctrine of claim preclusion. The district court dismissed the 
action. The circuit court first noted, "[wle review de novo the district 
court's application of the principles of res j ~ d i c a t a , " ~ ~  and then held the 
plaintiffs retaliatory discharge action was not barred by claim 
preclusion because it occurred after the commencement of the prior 
action. The court stated, "'[c]laims arising subsequent to a prior action 
need not, and often perhaps could not, have been brought in that prior 
action; accordingly, they are not barred by res judicata regardless of 
whether they are premised on facts representing a continuance of the 
same course of conduct."' The circuit court pointed out that when a 
plaintiffs motion to amend a complaint is denied, and the claim is 
brought later as a separate lawsuit, the decision denying leave to amend 
is irrelevant to the claim preclusion analysis.35 
In three other summary order cases, the Second Circuit affirmed the 
district court's use of claim preclusion to bar plaintiffs actions. In 
Bettis v.  ell^,^^ a wrongful termination claim by a former police 
department employee against city and police commissioners was brought 
subsequent to a prior federal claim that was dismissed on summary 
judgment.37 In the second action, Bettis contended that his claims were 
based on different legal theories and that the appellees had 
inappropriately withheld information during the prior litigation. 
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit stated, "res judicata bars relitigation of 
issues that 'could have been raised' in a prior action. Similarly, any 
allegations of misconduct in the prior litigation should have been raised 
33. See Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 685-87 (2d. Cir. 
2001). In 1995, Legnani filed an action under Title VII and the New York City Human Rights 
Law against her employer, defendant appellee. The action was dismissed as time-barred 
under 42 U.S.C. 9 2000e-5(e)(l). The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. 
34. Legnani, 400 F.3d at 141. 
35. Id. at 141-42. 
36. 137 F. App'x 381 (2d Cir. 2005). 
37. See Bettis v. Safir, No. 97-CV-1908,2000 WL 1336055 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15,2000). 
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in an appropriate challenge to that judgment."38 Similarly, in Moss v. E. 
on A G , ~ ~  the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of 
plaintiffs claims on res judicata (claim preclusion) grounds. The court 
stated, "Moss raised his present claims in prior proceedings. The fact 
that he titles his complaint differently in this case does not allow him to 
avoid the preclusive effect of res j~dicata."~' Also, in Virgo v. U. S. 
Customs ~e rv ice ,~ '  the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's 
dismissal of plaintiffs actions on res judicata grounds. The court stated: 
We acknowledge that Virgo changed his legal argument between the 2001 suit 
and the 2004 motion-in the former, Virgo claimed that he had received 
inadequate notice of seizure; in the latter, he argued that the seizure was 
invalid on criminal procedure grounds. But it is clear that Virgo's 2004 claims 
for the same funds from the same federal agency were or could have been 
raised in the complaint he filed in 2 0 0 1 . ~ ~  
In Doctor S Associates, Inc. v. ~ i c k e l , ~ ~  the Second Circuit affirmed 
the district court's decision not to give a prior judgment issue preclusion 
effect.44 The circuit court based its decision on a determination that, 
under Illinois law, a judgment is not final until the time for appeal has 
expired or until appeals have been exhausted. This decision reminds the 
bench and bar that, under Erie principles, the law of the forum where the 
first judgment was granted should be used to determine if issue 
preclusion is applicable. Under New York state law, a judgment is final 
when entered, but Illinois case law applies different standards for 
deciding when a judgment is final for res judicata purposes.45 
38. Bettis, 137 F. App'x at 382 (citations omitted). See generally FED. R. ClV. P. 
60(b) (the court may "relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding" resulting from "fraud . . . misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 
adverse party . . . ."). 
39. 118 F. App'x 553 (2d. Cir. 2004). 
40. Id. at 554. 
41. 123 F. App'x 418 (2d Cir. 2005). 
42. Id. at 420 (internal quotations omitted). 
43. 123 F. App'x 416 (2d Cir. 2005). 
44. Id. Appellants appealed from a decision of the district court confirming an 
arbitration award that resolved their dispute with the appellee. On appeal, appellants argued 
that the arbitrator failed to afford res judicata effect to a prior default judgment obtained by 
the appellants and to a prior judgment obtained by their landlord. The Second Circuit rejected 
these arguments. 
45. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995), wherein the Second 
Circuit concluded that a default judgment could not be given res judicata effect because it 
would not be considered final under Illinois law. 
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A. Administrative Determinations 
There are five significant district court decisions that apply the 
doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion to administrative 
determinations. These decisions indicate that some of the Second 
Circuit's trial judges may be inclined to conserve judicial resources and 
reduce burdensome caseloads by relaxing their demands on traditional 
requirements of fairness and due process. 
In Light Sources, Inc. v. Cosmedico Light, lnc. ,46 an administrative 
determination by the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board ("TTAB") was 
given claim preclusion effect by the district court.47 The court pointed 
out, "[glenerally, administrative proceedings may have res judicata 
effect if they are adjudicative in nature."48 The court noted that the 
TTAB acted in a judicial capacity because it was an adversarial 
proceeding. Thus a fraud claim, which could have been brought in the 
administrative hearings, was barred. However, in Stepheny v. BrookIyn 
Hebrew School for Special ~ h i l d r e n ; ~  the district court refused to apply 
issue preclusion to a prior administrative determination because the 
administrative law judge did not consider the issues brought before the 
federal court. Judge Glasser held that the administrative law judge had 
considered only the limited issue of whether the plaintiff was entitled to 
unemployment law benefits based upon her alleged misconduct in 
connection with her employer. The employer had not sent a 
representative or submitted any evidence to the administrative tribunal, 
which supported its position in the federal lawsuit. 
46. 360 F. Supp. 2d 432 (D. Conn. 2005). 
47. The Trademark Trial and Appeals Board was acting as an administrative agency. 
Id. at 438. 
48. Id. See also, e.g., United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966) 
("When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolved disputed issues 
of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the 
courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose." (citations omitted)). 
49. 356 F. Supp. 2d 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (Former employees of a private school 
brought an action under Title VII, the New York City Human Rights law, and the New York 
State Human Rights Law alleging a racially hostile work environment, race discrimination, 
and retaliation. The School moved for summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds, 
arguing that the issue determinations of a state administrative law judge should be given 
preclusive effect.). 
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In Greenberg v. New York City Transit ~uthority," the District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York held that findings of the New 
York State Workman's Compensation Board ("WCB") had preclusive 
effect in New York courts under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The 
court explained the critical questions of determining whether the WCB 
findings had preclusive effect were whether there was an identity of 
issue and whether the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to contest 
the decision. The court reasoned that the burden of proving identity of 
the issue rested on the party invoking issue preclusion, while his 
opponent had the burden of proving that he did not have a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue. The court found that the plaintiff 
satisfied the burden of showing identity of issue that had been 
necessarily decided in the prior administrative action and was decisive of 
the federal action. The full and fair opportunity requirement was not 
raised or briefed by the defendants and was therefore ~ a i v e d . ~ '  Under 
the circumstances, the district court should have conducted its own 
inquiry into whether the defendant had an opportunity to litigate the 
issue of whether he unlawfilly discriminated against the plaintiff based 
on a disability within the definitions of WCB regulations. 
Similarly, in Barna v. ~ o r ~ a n , ~ ~  the district court concluded that a 
New York state agency's finding of no probable cause was res judicata 
as to the plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. 4 1981. The plaintiff argued 
that he was not given an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue of 
probable cause because he did not appear before the agency. 
Nonetheless, the district court defined the full and fair opportunity 
aspect of issue preclusion in terms of a party's failure to take advantage 
of an opportunity to litigate. Because Barna was notified of the need to 
respond to the agency's charges in a timely manner and failed to do so, 
he waived the opportunity, and issue preclusion could be asserted 
against him.53 
50. 336 F. Supp. 2d 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
5 1. Id. at 250 ("Thus, plaintiff satisfies the burden of showing that defendant unlawfully 
discriminated against him based on a disability within the meaning of both NYSHRL and 
NYCHRL. Summary judgment in plaintiff's favor on these claims should be granted."). 
52. 341 F. Supp. 2d 164 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (Plaintiff filed a complaint with the New 
York State Department of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. He was notified by the Department of a probable cause hearing and warned that 
if he failed to respond, a determination would be made on the record. The plaintiff failed to 
respond and then filed his federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.). 
53. Id. at 167. The district court stated that a state agency's resolution of factual issues 
adverse to the complainant will bar a federal civil rights action "if (I) the state agency was 
acting in a judicial capacity; (2) the disputed issues of fact were properly before the agency 
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In Levich v. Liberty Central School ~ i s t r i c t , ~ ~  administrative 
determinations were given issue preclusion effect to preclude the 
plaintiff from litigating his First Amendment claims in federal court. 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York recognized that 
the plaintiff did not choose to bring his First Amendment claim in the 
administrative forum, but, because he faced the possibility of losing his 
job, he had a strong incentive to litigate the issue as thoroughly as 
possible. The district court then found that the administrative hearing 
officer conducted the same balancing test that would be applied to 
plaintiffs claims in a 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 action in federal court. The 
court stated: "Simply because plaintiff is unhappy with the hearing 
officer's evidentiary ruling does not mean that plaintiff did not have a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and does not entitle him to a 
second chance for a more favorable outcome in another forum."55 The 
court's reliance on People v. ~ l e ~ ~ ~  is misplaced here because, in that 
case, the highest court of New York State made it clear that the full and 
fair opportunity requirement is more than traditional notions of due 
process.57 As a matter of first impression, the Levich court also dealt 
with whether federal district courts adjudicating 5 1983 actions should 
apply issue preclusion to unreviewed legal determinations by state 
administrative bodies. The district court reviewed two leading decisions 
from other and declined to extend preclusive effect to 
unreviewed agency determinations of law.59 
and the parties were given an adequate opportunity to litigate them; and (3) the courts of the 
particular state would give the agency's fact-finding determinations preclusive effect." Id. at 
168. Plaintiff agreed that the first and third requirements were met, but argued that he was not 
given an adequate opportunity to litigate. The district court held this requirement was 
satisfied because the plaintiff was not deprived of an opportunity to be heard. The court 
stated: "Barna's failure to take advantage of the opportunity does not demonstrate a 
deprivation of it." Id. 
54. 361F.Supp.2dI5I(S.D.N.Y.2004). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 158. 
57. See417 N.E.2d 518 (N.Y. 1980). 
58.  Levich, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 160-61. See also Eilrich v. Remas, 839 F.2d 630, 634 
n.2 (9th Cir. 1988), and Edmundson v. Borough of Kennet Square, 4 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
59. Levich, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 160. The district court relied on Univ. of Tern. v. Elliot, 
478 U.S. 788 (1986), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court discussed whether issue preclusion is 
applicable to unreviewed state agency determinations. In Edmundson, the Third Circuit held 
that unreviewed determinations of law could not be given preclusive effect under Elliot 
because of the Supreme Court's very specific use of the word "factfinding" throughout the 
opinion. Edmundson, 4 F.3d at 192. The district court relied on Edmundson's interpretation 
of the law. 
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B. Arbitral Determinations 
In In  re  el,^^ the District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York held that a prior arbitration proceeding precluded a debtor from 
relitigating issues of the debtor's fraud. The arbitration panel had issued 
an award against the debtor and in favor of the appellees. The debtor 
never appealed the award, and a bankruptcy court granted appellees' 
motion for summary judgment and stated that the debtor was collaterally 
estopped from relitigating issues previously determined after years of 
litigation in the arbitration proceeding. On appeal, the district court 
noted it must refer to the applicable state law where the arbitration was 
held. Thus, Florida law governed the applicability of issue preclusion. 
The debtor argued he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue at the arbitration hearing because the panel precluded him from 
testifying or offering evidence on his own behalf at the hearing. The 
district court reasoned that because the debtor failed to respond to prior 
orders from the arbitration panel he had been given a full opportunity to 
defend himself and the "actually litigated" requirement under Florida 
law was ~atisfied.~' The court stated, "In the instant case, the Court 
finds that the actually litigated element is met, because Debtor had the 
full opportunity to defend himself at the Arbitration Proceeding and 
voluntarily chose not to comply with several orders."62 
In Dujardin v. Liberty Media C ~ r p . , ~ ~  the district court noted that 
"[ilt is well settled that collateral estoppel or issue preclusion applies to 
issues resolved by a prior arbitrat i~n."~~ The court refused to apply the 
doctrine because Dujardin failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that 
the damages issue decided by the arbitrator was identical to the issue 
presented before the district court.65 Thus, the plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment was denied to the extent it sought a determination as 
to damages based on the collateral estoppel effect of the arbitrator's 
ruling.66 
60. 315 B.R. 645 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
61. Id. at 648. 
62. Id. at 649. 
63. 359 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
64. Id. at 340. 
65. Id. at 359. 
66. Id. 
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C. Administrative and Arbitral Unfairness 
When federal courts give preclusive effect to decisions by 
administrative and arbitral bodies, they assume fairness and the 
opportunity to litigate can be satisfied without pre-trial discovery, formal 
application of the rules of evidence, or fact-finding juries. This raises 
the question of whether litigants should be deprived of rights guaranteed 
to them by federal courts. 
There are many advantages to extensive discovery in federal courts: 
it assures fairness to the litigants, prevents surprises, encourages 
settlements, and improves the efficiency of a trial or hearing and the 
quality of the decisions made. Administrative and arbitral 
determinations are usually made without dis~overy.~' This means that 
litigants are not given access to relevant and nonprivileged information 
that is in the custody of their adversaries. They are unable to formulate 
issues as they would in a court of law and cannot fully present 
constitutional claims. Also, administrative and arbitral forums are not 
bound by the rules of evidence. This means determinations can be made 
based on hearsay, testimony that would be prohibited in courts of law, 
and pursuant to inferences not permitted in courts of law. The plaintiffs 
burden of proof and the preponderance of evidence standards in arbitral 
and administrative forums differ from those in federal courts. Justice 
and fairness in judicial forums are viewed in terms of formal rituals 
supervised by an impartial and independent judiciary. Rules of 
evidence, procedure, and case law govern the development and 
application of these rituals. Justice and fairness in administrative and 
arbitral forums focus, primarily, on giving citizens access to simplified 
dispute resolution systems that do not feature the procedural protections 
provided in federal courts. In addition, many administrative and arbitral 
hearing officers are employed by the same agencies that establish the 
regulations the officials are applying. Based on these concerns, 
application of res judicata principles to administrative and arbitral 
determinations should be limited. 
67. Jay C .  Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine oflssue 
Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding a Court of Law, 55 
FORDHAM L. REV. 63,84-88 (1986). 
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RES JUDICATA 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Published 2005 Second Circuit res judicata decisions demonstrate 
that courts in the Second Circuit have immense respect for the doctrine 
of res judicata. As demonstrated above, courts within the Second Circuit 
rely on the doctrine to achieve finality, to prevent inconsistent 
judgments, and to allocate judicial resources. 
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